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ABSTRACT 
In determining the enforceability of online contracts, namely those 
formed from the use of smartphone applications, courts typically look to 
whether the contract terms were reasonably conspicuous or communicated 
to the consumer. With the rise of “browse-wrap” contracts, where terms 
are not directly communicated to the consumer or where the consumer is 
not required to click the equivalent of an “I agree” button clearly 
manifesting assent to the terms, courts have inconsistently applied the 
reasonable communicativeness standard to the detriment of consumers and 
application developers alike. This Comment will explore the development 
of browse-wrap contracting jurisprudence and the need to embrace the 
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. and GDPR requirements that 
all contracts entered into online are only enforceable once the consumer 
clearly and unambiguously manifests assent to the contract’s terms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Online consumer-corporate contracts, while convenient, have faced 
regular litigation and inconsistent rulings regarding enforceability in the 
modern age. Today, many Americans regularly bind themselves to 
contract terms with corporations with the simple click of a button on a 
mobile application. Consumers, rather than negotiating each contract term, 
will generally assent to whatever contract terms the service provider or 
producer requires. Yet, how many of these consumers understand the 
terms they agree to? What constitutes a manifestation of assent? And what 
clauses are enforceable, especially if the terms are inaccessible, “buried,” 
or “inconspicuous”?1 These are the issues courts have grappled with and 
are especially relevant given the recent litigation against Uber.2 
Modern corporations contracting with consumers via the internet 
have developed new methods to make terms more ambiguous while still 
maintaining their enforceability. While terms placed completely out of 
sight are unenforceable,3 some companies have tried more “subtle ways of 
binding consumers to terms without drawing the consumer’s attention to 
those terms.”4 Corporations know that consumers are unlikely to read 
lengthy contracts engulfed in legalese;5 indeed, many have shifted to 
drafting more ambiguous terms, allowing corporations to enforce 
contracts that consumers would never have otherwise agreed to. 
The recent Uber cases are an avid illustration of the ambiguity found 
in modern contracts. The first and second circuits split in Cullinane v. 
Uber Technologies and Meyer v. Uber Technologies (Uber cases) as to 
whether mandatory arbitration clauses—terms not directly viewable by the 
 
 1. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Sgouros v. TransUnion 
Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1035–36 (7th Cir. 2016); and then quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & 
Aikman Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)). 
 2. See generally Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer, 868 F.3d 66. 
 3. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 4. Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Justice, P.C. in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Meyer v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d. 66 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-2750 (L), 16-2752), 2016 WL 7157289 
[hereinafter Meyer Brief]. 
 5. See, e.g., Gerrit De Geest, The Signing-Without-Reading Problem: An Analysis of the 
European Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW: CONSEQUENCES OF 
ECONOMIC NORMS 213, 214 (2002) (few people read or understand contracts they make); Yannis 
Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (2014) [hereinafter Bakos et al. 2014] (finding that only one or two of every 
thousand internet retail software shoppers choose to access license agreements, and that the cost of 
reading and comprehending the contracts are key factors). 
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consumer but accessible via hyperlink—are enforceable.6 Uber, in both 
cases, utilized what is colloquially known as a browse-wrap contract in 
which a user could assent to a contract’s terms by registering for a service, 
even if the terms were not directly viewable to the user. Because the first 
and second circuits ruled so differently in each case on similar fact 
patterns, the need for a clarification in the law of online contracting is 
underscored. While it is true that “new commerce on the Internet . . . has 
not fundamentally changed the principles of contract,”7 these foundational 
principles are being undermined by practices demonstrated in many 
circumstances similar to the Uber example. One need only look to 
Facebook,8 Instagram,9 Google Maps,10 and other online services to realize 
the harmful effect these terms can have; these companies have used 
consumer’s private information in ways many never contemplated. Given 
the courts’ uncertainty regarding online contract formation and 
enforceability, and the harm inconspicuous contract terms may have on 
the consumer, this issue requires attention. 
In this Comment I will argue in favor of affirming the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Specht, which required unambiguous assent in 
contracting, especially in the online realm.11 In Section I, I will briefly 
discuss the history of online contracting and the development of browse-
wrap contract jurisprudence. In Section II, I will contrast the rulings in the 
Uber cases in detail. In Section III, I will discuss practical problems that 
undermine the reasonable conspicuous standard that is currently employed 
by many jurisdictions, including the following: (1) unequal bargaining 
power between consumer and corporation; (2) asymmetric information 
between the parties; (3) consumer inattentional blindness; and (4) the ease 
of developing click-wrap contracts. Finally, I will conclude and 
underscore the need for unambiguous assent; a solution that will balance 
not only the need for fast and efficient contracting but also the need to 
protect consumers from what seems to be a trend in favor of manipulating 
 
6. See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
868 F.3d 66, 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 7. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 8. Amanda Scherker, Didn’t Read Facebook’s Fine Print? Here’s Exactly What It Says, 
HUFFPOST (July 21, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/facebook-terms-condition_n_5551965 
[https://perma.cc/94KL-CVVG]. 
 9. Jessica Booth, 6 Ways Instagram May Be Compromising Your Privacy, Like with Its New DM 
Feature, HELLO GIGGLES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://hellogiggles.com/news/instagram-compromising-
privacy-dm-feature/ [https://perma.cc/M6AJ-7KAD]; Jose Pagliery, How an Artist Can Steal and Sell 
Your Instagram Photos, CNN (May 28, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/05/28/technology/do-i-
own-my-instagram-photos/ [https://perma.cc/MFB6-D7T9]. 
 10. Ryan Nakashima, Google Tracks Your Movements, Like It or Not, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 
13, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb [https://perma.cc/6UVU-
GRVJ]. 
 11. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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everyday mobile phone and internet users into signing contracts with ill-
advised terms. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF BROWSE-WRAP & ONLINE CONTRACTING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The jurisprudence behind the enforceability of electronic contracting 
has evolved since the early 1990s. Moving from the traditional offer and 
acceptance, courts began to accept new types of agreements and different 
modes of assent. In large part, beginning with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,12 
so-called “shrink-wrap” agreements—unilateral contracts where 
consumers manifest “assent to [contract] terms by engaging in a particular 
course of conduct that the license specifies constitutes acceptance”13—
became enforceable. Breaking the shrink-wrap on prepackaged software, 
or running the software after purchasing, indicated that the purchaser 
manifested assent to the software company’s take-it-or-leave-it terms.14 
Subsequent rulings have generally upheld the enforceability of “click-
wrap” contracts—an extension of the shrink-wrap concept—where a 
consumer manifests assent by clicking an “I agree” button to a standard 
set of readable terms.15 However, there is still a conflict in the law behind 
so-called “browse-wrap” agreements—the type of contracts at issue in the 
Uber cases. Under a “browse-wrap” contract, the contract terms are not 
directly viewable; instead, a potential consumer has the option of 
accessing the terms via a hyperlink but can still assent to the contract 
without clicking the hyperlink.16 
Before the 1996 ProCD decision, courts held that shrink-wrap 
contracts were unenforceable unilateral contracts; Step-Saver Data 
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology17 is a good illustration. In a dispute 
between merchants, the court held the shrink-wrap license was 
unenforceable on the theory that the terms at issue were proposed additions 
to the contract but were not incorporated into the contract because the 
terms were material alterations of the contract governed under UCC 2-
 
 12. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 13. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2006). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Bill Wiese, The Enforceability of Browsewrap Agreements, 7 J. INTERNET L. 1, 14 (2004). 
See generally Stephen Y. Chow, A Snapshot of Online Contracting Two Decades After ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, 73 BUS. LAW. 267 (2017) (distinguishing between click-wrap and browse-wrap 
contracts). 
 16. Wiese, supra note 15, at 14. 
 17. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105–06 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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207.18 Contract terms were not accepted merely by breaking the plastic 
wrapping around the software.19 The terms, located on the box-top of 
software Step-Saver purchased from The Software Link, Inc. (TSL), were 
standard for all consumers and contained disclaimers of all express and 
implied warranties.20 A typical transaction between Step-Saver and TSL 
constituted an order made through a phone call, coupled with a purchase 
order that detailed quantity, price, and shipping terms for the software.21 
TSL would send an invoice with the goods, containing identical terms as 
the purchase order.22 Disclaimers were never discussed or negotiated.23 
However, TSL argued that too many “material terms were omitted” during 
the phone calls to constitute an acceptance of the order and that the box-
top terms were a counteroffer.24 By purchasing the software and breaking 
the surrounding shrink-wrap, Step-Saver manifested assent to disclaimers 
embedded in the box-top terms.25 In typical “battle of the forms”26 fashion, 
the court disagreed on the theory that the box-top license under UCC 2-
207 was an additional proposal to the contract rather than an acceptance 
conditioned on Step-Saver’s opening of the software packaging.27 Because 
the terms “materially alter[ed]” the contract, they were not incorporated.28 
 
 18. U.C.C. § 2-207 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (“A definite and seasonable 
expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as 
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, 
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. . . . The 
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such 
terms become part of the contract unless . . . they materially alter [the contract].” Course of conduct 
may also show the parties accepted the proposed contract alterations). 
 19. See Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 103. 
 20. Id. at 96–97. 
 21. Id. at 95–96. 
 22. Id. at 96. 
 23. See id. at 97. 
 24. Id. at 97–98. 
 25. See id. at 98. 
 26. “Battle of the forms” refers to the rule that conflicting terms cancel each other out. U.C.C. 
§ 2-207 cmt. 6 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002); see also Learning Works, Inc., v. The 
Learning Annex, Inc., 830 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the letter in which seller agreed to 
buyer’s proposed terms but asserted an additional term of interest on the deferred portion of the 
purchase price was not an acceptance of buyer’s offer but, rather, a counteroffer); Dorton v. Collins & 
Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) (case remanded to determine whether additional terms 
materially altered the contract; if so, they would be canceled out of the final agreement); Challenge 
Mach. Co. v. Mattison Mach. Works, 359 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (conflicting provisions 
of forms instituted by buyer and seller of precision grinder, one form an offer, and one form an 
acceptance, cancelled each other out and did not become a part of the contract); Owens-Corning 
Fiberglass Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1982) (if acceptance contains terms 
which conflict with terms of offer, then conflicting terms cancel each other out and the contract 
between parties consists of terms which both parties expressly agree, with contested terms being 
supplied by applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 27. Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d 91 at 105–06. 
 28. Id. at 106. 
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For the contract to have been enforceable, TSL must have “clearly 
express[ed] its unwillingness to proceed with the transactions unless its 
additional terms were incorporated into the parties’s agreement.”29 
The decision in ProCD was a dramatic shift in the law. In a famous 
opinion, Judge Easterbrook treated the shrink-wrap license as an ordinary 
contract of sale, which could only be invalidated for common law 
contractual reasons, such as fraud or unconscionability.30 Although the 
contract terms were “secret” to the consumer at the time of purchase, 
because the license did not become immediately effectual upon opening 
the packaging but upon use of the software, the contract was valid.31 
ProCD produced a software database, a compilation of over 3,000 
telephone directories,32 which was available for commercial and non-
commercial use, with the latter available at a lower price but coupled with 
a license limiting the use to such purposes.33 Zeidenberg purchased the 
non-commercial software but ignored the license and proceeded to resell 
the information on his own database for-profit.34 In contrast to Step-Saver, 
Easterbrook relied on UCC 2-204,35 finding that UCC 2-207 was 
“irrelevant” as there was only one form in this case.36 Easterbrook 
reasoned: 
“A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient 
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which 
recognizes the existence of such a contract.” A vendor, as master of 
the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose 
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A 
buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat 
as acceptance . . . So although the district judge was right to say that 
a contract can be, and often is, formed simply by paying the price and 
walking out of the store, the UCC permits contracts to be formed in 
other ways.37 
 
The ProCD court’s language was key for the development of 
contracting in the electronic age. Easterbrook treated shrink-wrap 
contracting as a simple contract of sale, avoiding many of the problems 
that come with alterations to contracts and the invocation of the battle of 
 
 29. Id. at 103. 
 30. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 31. Id. at 1450, 1452–53. 
 32. Id. at 1449. 
 33. Id. at 1450. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See U.C.C. § 2-204 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002). 
 36. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452. 
 37. Id. 
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the forms,38 namely uncertainty of whether a contract was formed and, if 
so, which terms apply. The consequences of this reasoning have pervaded 
modern clickwrap cases—such standard form unilateral contracts, where 
the click of a button manifests assent, have become so commonplace in 
the age of online contracting that they are rarely controversial. While 
Easterbrook’s reasoning has arguably led to more efficient contracting, 
new and unique problems have arisen, particularly in so-called browse-
wrap cases. 
Browse-wrap contracts have not been upheld in court as consistently 
as their click-wrap counterparts.39 In contrast to click-wrap, where terms 
must be directly viewed and accepted by clicking a button often stating “I 
agree,” browse-wrap terms are not directly viewable by the consumer, and 
accessing the terms is not required for use of the software or service.40 
Often, browse-wrap terms are hidden behind a hyperlink.41 A court may 
find such agreements invalid if there is no “reasonable 
communicativeness” or the consumer lacked constructive notice of the 
contract terms.42 In some cases, consumers may not even realize that they 
assented to a binding agreement.43 
 
 38. There have been many criticisms over Judge Easterbrook’s analysis in ProCD. See, e.g., 
Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a 
Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 643 (2004) (arguing that 
Judge Easterbrook’s imposition of a “terms later” contracting rule was “devoid of legal, economic, 
and moral sanction”); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1239, 1240 (1995) (arguing that “shrinkwrap licenses should not be effective to alter the balance 
of rights created under federal law”); Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke 
to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. 
REV. 452, 463 (2013) (showing how scholars have found a lot to dislike about shrink-wrap’s “‘pay 
now, terms later’ presentation of contract terms. . . . [N]ot only did such a presentation fly in the face 
of traditional contract formation doctrine, the content of the shrinkwrap terms wreaked havoc on the 
balance struck by the federal intellectual property statutes”). But see Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1181, 1186–89, 
1194 (2010) (discussing the tension between providing too much or too little information to the 
consumer, while also calling Judge Easterbrook’s opinion a “masterpiece of realist judging”). 
 39. See, e.g., Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 301–03 (D. Mass. 2016) (contract found 
enforceable as users were required to scroll through the terms and click a blue “I accept” button before 
registering), aff’d, 918 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 2019); i-Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. 
Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (clicking an “I agree” button was sufficient to find an enforceable 
clickwrap agreement); Campinha-Bacote v. AT&T Corp., No. 16AP–889, 2017 WL 2817566, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2017) (click-wrap agreement held to be enforceable even though appellant 
claimed that he never had an opportunity to review the terms of service); Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., 
No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, at *5 (R.I. Super. May 27, 1998) (one of the first click-wrap cases, 
where the court held that clicking an “I agree” button is analogous to signing a written instrument); 
see also Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH L.J. 577 (2007). 
 40. Wiese, supra note 15, at 14. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 38, at 460, 471. 
 43. Wiese, supra note 15, at 14. 
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In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., the court held a 
software developer did not provide reasonable notice of license terms, 
including an arbitration provision, where the purchaser had to scroll below 
the webpage’s “download” button to find the contract terms—terms that 
were not required to be viewed before use of the software.44 The plaintiffs 
in the case alleged that by downloading Smart Download, a program 
which enhanced the internet browser’s web-browsing capabilities, they 
were effectively being “eavesdropp[ed]” upon.45 The terms authorizing 
this capability were not easily accessible by the plaintiffs, as they were not 
directly viewable before the button to install Smart Download.46 Notably, 
there was no “I accept” button,47 and a buyer did not have to click on or 
read terms to manifest assent.48 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did 
not have constructive notice of the terms, as a reasonably prudent offeree 
in their position would not have known of the pertinent agreement prior to 
acting.49 Here, the court acknowledged that “[t]he conduct of a party is not 
effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the 
conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer 
from his conduct that he assents.”50 Further, the court applied California 
common law, which provides that a party’s contractual assent is judged 
objectively “by the party’s outward manifestation of consent.”51 
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Register.com v. Verio, Inc. affirmed 
the browse-wrap contract was enforceable.52 The plaintiff, Register.com 
(Register), issued domain names over the internet.53 Verio, as a 
competitor, developed a “robot” that would track new domain names that 
registered with the plaintiff, and use the acquired data to solicit the new 
registrants.54 Verio’s tracking of domain names was in violation of an 
agreement that users of Register’s website would “support the 
transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations 
via email.”55 Although Verio argued it never manifested assent by clicking 
an “I agree” button, the contract was still held to be enforceable.56 In 
 
 44. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 45. Id. at 21. 
 46. Id. at 23. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 23. 
 49. Id. at 30. 
 50. Id. at 29 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)). 
 51. Id. (quoting Cedars Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Mid-West Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 
1008 (C.D. Cal. 2000)) (emphasis added). 
 52. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 53. Id. at 395. 
 54. Id. at 396. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 402–03. 
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Specht, users had one opportunity to download the software and view the 
clandestine terms, with the court reasoning that “there was no way to 
determine that any downloader had seen the terms of the offer.”57 Here, 
Verio admitted it was “fully aware” of Register’s terms—terms visible 
each time Verio accessed the website data.58 Notably, the court went on to 
criticize a federal district court’s analysis in Ticketmaster Corp. v. 
Tickets.com59 in which the court held there was insufficient proof of an 
agreement simply because a website user was not required to click an “I 
agree” box before proceeding: “[W]here the taker of 
information . . . [knows] full well the terms . . . we see no reason why the 
enforceability of the offeror’s terms should depend on whether the taker 
states (or clicks), ‘I agree.’”60 
The evolution of these cases shows how courts have inconsistently 
held whether an online contract is formed, particularly when a corporation 
utilizes a browse-wrap contract, often with inconspicuous terms and 
unclear modes of manifesting assent. In the future, courts should adopt the 
holding in Specht rather than Verio. While the courts in both cases 
considered whether the contract terms were reasonably conspicuous, the 
law can be simplified to allow contract formation to be more certain by 
adopting a rule that a party must expressly and unambiguously assent to 
the contract terms rather than relying on evidence of mere knowledge of 
contract terms as the court did in Verio. 
II. THE UBER CASES 
The enforceability of browse-wrap contracts was again analyzed in 
the recent Uber cases by the first and second circuits. The courts 
considered whether the terms were “reasonably conspicuous”61 rather than 
adopt a rule that a party’s lack of unambiguous, express assent is a per se 
showing of unreasonably conspicuous notice. It was unsurprising that the 
circuits split on whether reasonable conspicuous notice was given due to 
the inconsistent application of contract law in this context. 
Generally, the facts are the same for both cases. The plaintiffs 
challenged the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses embedded 
 
 57. Id. at 402. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See generally Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99–7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 
WL 525390 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2000). 
 60. Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403 (2d Cir. 2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 69 (1)(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Silence and inaction operate as an acceptance . 
. . [w]here an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them 
and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation.”). 
 61. See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d. 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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within terms and conditions available via a hyperlink during the process 
of creating an Uber account.62 Uber offers an application for smartphones 
that allows users to request rides from third-party drivers.63 In creating an 
account, customers may manually input personal information when 
registering in lieu of using preexisting Facebook or Google accounts.64 
Potential users are then directed to a payment screen where they may input 
credit card information and click “register” to complete the process.65 
Below the payment input fields, there is text advising users that by creating 
an Uber account they agree to the “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy.”66 
In a slightly newer version of the application, these terms were included 
in a blue hyperlink, not directly viewable on the payment page.67 The 
hyperlink was white for these terms in the older version.68 
The first of the two cases, Meyer, was decided by the Second Circuit. 
Although the contract terms were not directly viewable during the 
application process, the court held that the contract and the embedded 
mandatory arbitration clause are enforceable.69 The Second Circuit based 
this ruling on California common law; a contract will only be found where 
there is “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms 
and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms.”70 In the context 
of web-interfaces, the court reasoned that browse-wrap contracts do not 
require express assent, so enforceability depends on “whether the user has 
actual or constructive knowledge of a website’s terms and conditions,”71 
or if the terms were “reasonably communicated to the user.”72 
Employing a fact-based inquiry, the court noted the pervasiveness of 
the modern cell phone.73 In the modern world, the court does not need to 
“presume that the user has never before encountered an app or entered into 
a contract using a smartphone. . . . [A] reasonably prudent smartphone 
user knows that text that is highlighted in blue and underlined is 
hyperlinked to another webpage where additional information will be 
found.”74 Because the screen was “uncluttered” and nothing was 
 
 62. Cullinane, 893 F.3d. at 59; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 71. 
 63. Always the ride you want, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/ride/ [https://perma.cc/T6YN-
ZHVC]. 
 64. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 70. 
 65. Id at 71. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 57.  
 69. Meyer, 868 F.3d. at 81. 
 70. Id. at 75 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 71. Id. (citing Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 72. Id. at 76. 
 73. Id. at 77. 
 74. Id. at 77–78. 
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misleading about the nature of the hyperlink, the court held that a modern 
user would have objectively reasonable notice of the terms.75 And even 
though the registration button had two functions of both creating an 
account and assenting to the terms, that alone did not render the terms 
ambiguous. The terms were viewable prior to registration, and text on the 
payment screen expressly warned applicants about the nature of the 
registration button—that it was indeed a manifestation of assent.76 
Regardless of whether the applicant clicked on the hyperlink, because the 
terms of service were provided simultaneously to enrollment and because 
a supposed reasonable consumer knew or should have known that by 
clicking the registration button he or she agreed to the terms and 
conditions, Uber had provided “reasonably conspicuous notice.”77 
The First Circuit in Cullinane ruled differently, finding that the 
mandatory arbitration clause was not enforceable because the terms were 
not reasonably conspicuous to the consumer.78 The court utilized a two-
step inquiry based on underlying Massachusetts common law: first, 
“whether the contract terms were ‘reasonably communicated to the 
plaintiffs’”; and second, “whether the record shows that those terms were 
‘accepted and, if so, the manner of acceptance.’”79 As noted, under 
Massachusetts common law, there is no requirement that notice be clear 
and conspicuous but merely reasonably conspicuous. The burden lies on 
the party seeking to enforce mandatory arbitration to prove that the terms 
were reasonably communicated and accepted.80 
The court seemingly ruled differently here because of a few minor 
distinctions between various versions of the Uber application. Unlike 
Meyer, the hyperlink was in bolded white font and located in a grey box, 
which the court thought was atypical given that hyperlinks are commonly 
in blue font.81 This may still have been sufficient to provide reasonable 
notice, but other terms on the screen were also bolded and in similar font 
size.82 The inclusion of more attention-grabbing items, such as a large blue 
PayPal button, only served to diminish the conspicuousness of the 
hyperlink.83 The court summarized by stating: 
Even though the hyperlink did possess some of the characteristics that 
make a term conspicuous, the presence of other terms on the same 
 
 75. Id. at 79. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 79. Id. at 62 (quoting Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 612–13 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 62. 
 82. Id. at 63. 
 83. Id. 
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screen with a similar or larger size, typeface, and with more 
noticeable attributes diminished the hyperlink’s capability to grab the 
user’s attention. If everything on the screen is written with 
conspicuous features, then nothing is conspicuous.84 
Although the Circuit Courts employed essentially the same tests, 
minor differences in application design and inherent differences in the 
belief of what constitutes reasonable conspicuousness resulted in the 
inconsistent rulings. While a court may reasonably find that font size and 
text color may be dispositive in determining whether browse-wrap terms 
are reasonably communicated, there must be more clarity in the law so that 
courts may consistently apply contract law to the inevitably unending 
stream of new applications. Also so that application designers—often 
uneducated in the law—may have reasonable expectations as to what 
constitutes permissible application design. These cases again underscore 
the need to require express, unambiguous assent in contracting. The 
arbitrary differences here between two versions of the same application 
are evidence that the reasonable communicativeness standard should be 
coupled with a requirement for unambiguous assent. 
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF BROWSE-WRAP CONTRACTING 
Beyond legal inconsistencies, there are also practical problems that 
need to be considered with online contracting as the law is currently 
written. These include (1) unequal bargaining power between consumer 
and corporation; (2) asymmetric information between the parties; (3) 
consumer inattentional blindness; and (4) the ease of developing click-
wrap contracts, which is further evidence of how browse-wrap contracts 
are unnecessary and can effectively be used to the detriment of the 
consumer. Requiring unambiguous assent in online contracting would 
help address these problems. 
A. Unequal Bargaining Power & Asymmetric Information 
Not all contracts should be treated equally. In contrast to contracts 
with bargained-for terms, problems of unequal power between parties and 
asymmetric information associated with standard form contracts 
emphasize the need to provide more, not less, consumer protection. Click-
wrap, rather than browse-wrap, contracts need to be enforced as they 
provide an additional degree of notice and clarity that mitigates the harm 
standard form contracts pose. 
Unequal bargaining power in this context can partly be understood 
as the corporation’s ability to dictate the nonprice terms of a contract. With 
 
 84. Id. at 63–64. 
2020] Enforceability of Online Contracts 1077 
standard form contracts, also known as contracts of adhesion, the 
consumer is unable to negotiate the terms and must either accept the terms 
in full or the corporation will not provide the good or service; no true 
bargain takes place.85 Typically, enterprises that use standard form 
contracts are in positions of strong bargaining power.86 “The weaker party 
[the consumer], in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a 
position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the 
standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all 
competitors use the same clauses.”87 The consumer must “subjugate” him 
or herself to terms understood vaguely, if at all.88 The power and freedom 
of contracting in these instances becomes a “one-sided privilege,” with 
adhesion contracts being suggested by one scholar to even go so far as 
becoming “effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and 
commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their 
own making upon a vast host of vassals.”89 
With unequal bargaining power also comes the issue of asymmetric 
information where the party in the position of power has more information 
than the consumer.90 In economics, the market becomes “inefficient” when 
transacting parties are “differently informed regarding the value of the 
good being exchanged”; here, the nonprice terms of the contract.91 
[I]n the absence of special information, a typical buyer will assume 
she is dealing with an average-quality seller and will pay no more 
than her reservation price for average–quality [nonprice terms]. 
 
 85. Black’s Law Dictionary defines contracts of adhesion as a “standard-form contract prepared 
by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position, [usually] a consumer, who adheres 
to the contract with little choice about the terms.” Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 86. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); see also Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 
U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005) (discussing power dynamics in bargaining and law); Shmuel I. Becher, 
Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge that is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 723, 726 (2008); Anne Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: 
Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996); Michael Z. Green, 
Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a 
Trap for the Unwary Consumer, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 112 (1993). But see Albert Choi & George 
Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1687 (2012) 
(suggesting that contracts where nonprice terms are changed may in fact be more efficient, at least 
when negotiations take place); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (stating that economics suggest that markets will 
normalize contract terms to make them socially efficient). 
 87. Kessler, supra note 86, at 632. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 640. 
 90. See generally Becher, supra note 86. 
 91. Avery Wiener Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 502–03 (Peter Newman ed., 2002). 
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Sellers of high–quality [terms] . . . will be unable to recover their 
costs.92 
Therefore, it is in the corporation’s best interest to draft self-serving terms. 
Further, many consumers will not read a standard form contract 
before signing, perpetuating the problem of asymmetric information.93 For 
one, there are communication costs associated with investigating a form, 
namely time and energy. The consumer must decide whether to invest 
these resources in evaluating a standardized form, which is usually 
complex and engulfed in legalese. After deciding to read a contract, these 
incurred costs of becoming informed are “sunk,” with the consumer 
“winding up in a situation where she just barely wants to accept but wishes 
she had not bothered to become informed.”94 It is optimal for the seller to 
place the buyer in this situation, and because the buyer can anticipate this 
turn of events, she prefers not to read the terms in the first place.95 
Therefore, “[i]n [market] equilibrium . . . buyers will not read, sellers will 
offer the lowest possible quality terms, and buyers will refuse to pay more 
than fly-by-night prices.”96 
B. Inattentional Blindness 
The notion raised in Meyer—that because of the proliferation of 
mobile devices and internet contracting a “reasonably prudent user”97 
should know that a hyperlink leads to contract terms—can be undermined 
 
 92. Id. at 504. 
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 94. Katz, supra note 91, at 504. 
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 96. Id. 
 97. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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by the expansive empirical science on inattentional blindness.98 
Inattentional blindness is essentially the idea that a person is “blind” to 
unexpected occurrences; one will fail to perceive things in their field of 
vision if they are focusing on something else.99 This occurs even if the 
object is fully visible.100 In the context of browse-wrap contracting, this 
blindness suggests that because consumers are focused on obtaining 
access to the service, such as Uber, and inserting necessary information, 
not only will they not read the terms behind the hyperlinks, they will even 
fail to notice the hyperlink itself.101 With the apparent trend toward making 
these hyperlinks as ambiguous as possible, whether by including more 
“attention grabbing items”102 or hiding the terms among text of similar font 
and size, the potential for inattentional blindness seems all the more likely. 
Inattentional blindness should not be confused with inattentional amnesia. 
Inattentional amnesia is a phenomenon where a person will initially notice 
an event then later disregard it as unimportant and fail to remember it; 
whereas with inattentional blindness, people fail to notice the unexpected 
event in the first place.103 
 
 
In one study, Harvard professor Steven Most and his colleagues 
conducted several experiments exploring sustained inattentional 
blindness.104 One experiment’s methodology involved users looking at a 
computer screen with white and black items against a gray background 
and an unexpected object running across the screen in the form of a red 
cross.105 Notably, users only observed the distinctive red cross seventy-
two percent of the time even though it was described as very distinctive.106 
Although the red cross was more distinctive than in earlier experiments 
where a white or black cross passed the screen on an aquamarine 
background, it was actually noticed less.107 
 
 98. See, e.g., Steven B. Most et al., How Not to Be Seen: The Contribution of Similarity and 
Selective Ignoring to Sustained Inattentional Blindness, 12 PSYCH. SCI. 9 (2001); Daniel J. Simons & 
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28 PERCEPTION 1059, 1064 (1999). 
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https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-inattentional-blindness-2795020 [https://perma.cc/ZE8N-
TLLB]. 
 100. See Most et al., supra note 98, at 9. 
 101. Meyer Brief, supra note 4, at 16–17. 
 102. See, e.g., Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 103. Simons & Chabris, supra note 98, at 1072–73. 
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 105. Id. at 14. 
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A study performed by Daniel J. Simons and Christopher F. Chabris 
further shows the real and powerful effect of inattentional blindness.108 
They strove to consider the nature of “unusual events” (objects that were 
clearly distinct from their surroundings).109 Several video segments with 
the same actors were filmed at the same time and place, and random 
observers were asked to watch the recordings.110 Each video showed two 
teams of white and black passing a basketball around while observers were 
instructed to keep count of the number of passes between a specific 
team.111 After a lapsed period of time, either a tall woman holding an open 
umbrella or a woman wearing a gorilla costume would walk across the 
screen.112 In one instance, the gorilla would stop in the middle of the screen 
as players continued passing the ball, face the camera, thump its chest, 
then continue walking off-screen.113 While these unexpected events may 
seem extremely obvious and distinct from the passing of a basketball, the 
results show that casual observers demonstrated sustained inattentional 
blindness and failed to notice either the gorilla or the umbrella woman.114 
About half of the observers failed to notice these seemingly obvious 
occurrences.115 Curiously, it was found that observers are actually more 
likely to notice unexpected events if the events are visually similar, rather 
than visually distinct, from their primary visual task.116 
The implications of these studies are that regardless of the 
hyperlink’s color or text, even if the hyperlink is visually distinct from the 
rest of the page, users may fail to notice the terms due to inattentional 
blindness. The consumer’s primary task is to obtain the service, whether 
by inserting account, payment, or other necessary information. While 
click-wrap contracts require users to scroll through entire contract terms, 
or at least click a separate button manifesting assent to the terms, browse-
wrap contracts hide terms behind hyperlinks not required to be visited 
before obtaining the service. The need to see the hyperlink is secondary—
an unexpected occurrence that users will often fail to perceive. 
C. Ease of Developing Click-Wrap Contracts 
While it is easy for companies to provide click-wrap rather than 
browse-wrap contracts for consumers, companies, including Uber, often 
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fail to do so. The supposed justification of reducing transaction costs117 by 
streamlining the service application process and making the process easier 
for consumers by not drowning them in legalese is undermined when 
considering successful examples of click-wrap contracts, including by 
Uber itself in other contexts.118 
To satisfy the basic rules of contract formation and notice, one need 
not provide the entire terms for a user to scroll through before signing. 
Indeed, a corporation can permissibly include a hyperlink to said terms, so 
long as it also includes a separate box where a user must click to manifest 
assent to the terms while also making it clear that the user must agree to 
the terms before they may access the service.119 Browse-wrap contracts are 
inferior because although they may include a hyperlink, they do not 
require the terms to be accessed or affirmatively agreed to by a click before 
the service is used.120 The separate box in many cases is all that is required. 
There are many examples of successful, easy to access click-wrap 
contracts.121 Amazon Web Services uses a checkbox that users must click 
before creating an account, coupled with text stating: “Check here to 
indicate that you have read and agree to the terms of the AWS Customer 
Agreement.”122 PayPal goes further. Before signing up for its service, a 
user must click a box which contains not only hyperlinks to the pertinent 
terms but in detail emphasizes key portions of terms the user agrees to the 
following: 
You have read and agree to the E-Communication Delivery Policy, 
which provides that . . . You have also read and agree to the User 
Agreement and Privacy Statement . . . [Y]ou give us permission to 
contact you about your PayPal branded accounts using automated 
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calls or texts to: service your accounts, investigate fraud, or collect a 
debt, but not for telemarketing.123 
Ironically, Uber utilizes an effective click-wrap contract with its 
surge pricing model. When faced with irregular circumstances, such as a 
dramatic increase in business, Uber increases its fares, calculated using a 
“multiplier on the typical fare to reflect increased passenger demand 
and/or decreased driver supply.”124 The application screen will clearly 
state that surge pricing is in effect, and depending on the city, will ask the 
user to type in the surge multiplier, or it will show the new calculated price 
upfront.125 The user will then click a separate button generally stating that 
they accept the new increased fare. With surge pricing, Uber itself 
admitted that it “work[s] on making sure [the increased price] is clear and 
understandable to riders.”126 If Uber can use click-wrap contracts 
effectively in the surge pricing context, it is certainly peculiar, if not 
deceptive, for it to then use browse-wrap contracts at the initial stage of 
registration when the consumer has more contractual issues at stake. 
Until the law requires unambiguous assent in online contracting, 
these practical problems will not be addressed. And it is certainly possible 
to make these changes. The European Union, with its adoption of the 
GDPR, provides guidance as to how such a law could be formulated. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION MODEL 
The European Union has two regulations,127 the Consumer Rights 
Directive (CRD)128 and the General Data Protection Regulation 
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(GDPR),129 recently enacted to combat many of the issues regarding 
consent and digital contracting also seen in the Uber cases. Not only does 
the GDPR, in the context of data processing, do away with browse-wrap 
contracting entirely, but both the CRD and the GDPR include a right of 
withdrawal among various other consumer protections.130 
Under the CRD, the consumer is permitted to unilaterally withdraw 
from an e-contract by returning the pertinent good to the trader for 
reimbursement.131 Article 9 of the CRD states that a consumer shall have 
fourteen days to withdraw from any “distance or off-premises contract,” 
given exceptions.132 There is no requirement that the consumer give “any 
reason” for the withdrawal.133 Typically though, this applies to online 
transactions in goods, whereas transactions for services, once “fully 
performed . . . with the consumer’s prior express consent, and with the 
acknowledgement that he will lose his right of withdrawal . . . [,]” are 
exempted.134 The right of withdrawal is designed to mitigate issues of 
asymmetric information.135 Rather than, say, walking into a shoe store and 
trying on the shoes to see if they fit, with digital contracts, the consumer 
must completely rely on the seller’s word as to the quality of the product. 
The right of withdrawal allows the consumer to return goods purchased 
online if they do not meet the consumer’s minimum standards.136 
While the CRD mostly applies to contracts for the sale of goods, the 
GDPR more directly combats issues associated with browse-wrap 
contracting. The GDPR applies to the processing of any personal data 
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online, including “the offering of goods or services” and the “monitoring 
of [the user’s] behavior.”137 Under the regulation, consent is defined as 
“any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the 
data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear 
affirmative action, signifies agreement . . . .”138 Consent must be presented 
in a manner which is “clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an 
intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.”139 
In contrast to the CRD, in the context of processing personal data, the 
consumer will have the right to withdraw his or her informed consent at 
any time; it must be as easy to withdraw consent as it is to give it.140 
By its terms, the GDPR makes sure that corporations are no longer 
able to use “illegible terms and conditions full of legalese,” as the request 
for consent must be in an “intelligible and easily accessible form.”141 The 
issue seen in Cullinane, where the hyperlink was hidden behind “more 
attention-grabbing items,” with other terms on the same screen with 
similar typeface and more noticeable attributes, would not be an issue 
under the GDPR, as such a hyperlink would have to be “clear and 
distinguishable from other matters.”142 Yet, the most pertinent language 
here is the GDPR’s requirement that consent be shown by a “clear and 
affirmative action”;143 browse-wrap contracts are impermissible. As we 
have seen in the Uber cases, under a browse-wrap, the hyperlink does not 
need to be clicked to manifest assent to the contract terms. The GDPR 
strengthens the requirements for consent by requiring, at the very least, for 
the consumer to click a button stating, “I agree.”144 
With the GDPR in particular, the European model addresses many 
of the issues present in American jurisprudence regarding browse-wrap 
contracting. By requiring clear, affirmative assent, the GDPR allows 
consumers the opportunity to at least be on notice of the terms they agree 
to and, at best, prevents the opportunistic veiling of unfavorable terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Following Specht and using the European Union model as an 
example, I propose that the law be changed regarding online contracting 
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to include a requirement for clear, affirmative, and unambiguous assent.145 
This should balance freedom of contract with consumer protection, 
resulting in not only efficient, but fair contracting. While online 
contracting is a necessity in the modern economy for corporation and 
consumer alike, in reality, consumers are not placed on a level playing 
field.146 As browse-wrap contracts have been inconsistently enforced in 
court,147 it would be better to simplify what constitutes reasonable 
conspicuous notice and strengthen the consent requirement by removing 
the possibility of browse-wrap contracting altogether with language 
mandating clear and affirmative assent. Corporations may protest but 
given their willingness to create click-wrap contracts in other instances,148 
and given the ease of doing so, there is little justification in failing to 
change the law. 
Requirements for clear, affirmative assent would be effective 
countermeasures against the practical problems associated with browse-
wrap contracting. Online contracting is not purchasing fruit at a stand, 
where terms of sale are commonly understood with no need to read 
specific terms.149 Rather, contracting online is vastly more complex, with 
terms the average consumer, even if read, would have a difficult time 
understanding. The aim of these requirements is not to overly burden 
companies but to balance the playing field between consumer and 
corporation. It is important that companies do not bury contract terms in 
unrelated or hidden screens and provide consumers at the very least an 
opportunity to understand the deal they are making. 
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